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INTRODUCTION

Among the myriad legal issues confronting states-like Colorado-that
are experimenting with the legalization of marijuana, is the need to
regulate "pot tourism" by visitors from other states where marijuana
remains illegal. In Colorado, the final recommendations from the
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
Thanks to Ben Barton, Beth Burch, Thomas Burch, Alli Denning, Woody Hartzog, Mike Kent, Rob
Mikos, Norman Williams, faculty members at the University of Tennessee College of Law, and the
students in Professor Mikos's federalism seminar at the Vanderbilt University Law School for
helpful comments, suggestions, and criticisms of an earlier draft. Apologies to Brewer & Shipley.
See BREWER & SfHPLEY, One Toke over the Line, on TARK1o (Kama Sutra Records 1970). Errors
that remain are, like, a bummer, man.
2279
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Amendment 64 Implementation Task Force included a proposal "to limit
purchases by state residents to an ounce at a time and to a quarter of an
ounce for out-of-state visitors." 1 The lower amounts for nonresidents were
intended to deter pot tourists from "smurfing"--visiting a number of
different dispensaries to accumulate larger amounts of marijuana with a
view to illegally reselling the pot. 2 Colorado's legislature adopted the task
force's recommendation in House Bill 1317 to establish the regulatory

framework for the legal sale of marijuana. 3 Colorado's governor recently
signed the Bill into law, 4 and among its provisions is a quarter-ounce

purchase limit for nonresidents. 5 Under Colorado's new law, the sale, to a
nonresident, of an amount in excess of the quarter-ounce limit is a class 2
misdemeanor, 6 punishable by between three and twelve months
imprisonment, a $250 to $1000 fine, or both.7

1. Ana Campoy, ColoradoSets Pot-SaleRules, WALL ST.J. (Apr. 9,2013, 7:26 PM), http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424127887323820304578411100470071698. Washington
State similarly decriminalized marijuana sales and possession. The state liquor control board was
put in charge of writing rules to implement Washington's initiative. Press Release, Wash. State
Liquor Control Bd., Liquor Control Board Statement Following the Passage of Initiative 502 (Nov.
7, 2012), availableat http://lcb.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/1-502/11-7-12-Board-Statement1502.pdf. The latest draft of Washington's rules do not include a nonresident purchase restriction
like Colorado's. Chapter 314-55 WA C: MariuanaLicenses, Application Process,Requirements,
and Reporting, WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD., https://lcb.app.box.com/adopted-rules (last
updated Apr. 30, 2014). For information about Colorado's marijuana laws see Laws: Constitution,
Statutes and Regulations - MariuanaEnforcement,COLO. DEP'TOF REVENUE: ENFORCEMENT DIV.,

https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/laws-constitution-statutes-and-regulationsmarijuana-enforcement (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). For additional information on marijuana
legalization throughout the United States see Irina D. Manta, The High Cost ofLow Sanctions, 66
FLA. L. REV. 157, 172-73 (2014).

2. John Ingold, Colorado Marijuana Task Force Recommends Allowing Pot Tourism,
DENVERPOST.COM (Feb. 19, 2013), available at http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/

ci_22623779/colorado-marijuana-task-force-recommends-allowing-pot-tourism (noting that "[t]he
goal [of the recommendation to limit sales to nonresidents] is to prevent 'smurfing,' which would
occur when one person goes from store-to-store accumulating marijuana to then sell into the black
market. The thinking is that lowering the amount of marijuana an out-of-stater could buy in any one
store would make smurfing too time-consuming to be worthwhile"). See generallySam Kamfin, The
Work of the Task Force to Implement Amendment 64: A Case Study, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE
157 (2013) (recounting the task force's work from a participant's perspective).
3. Matt Ferner, MarijuanaLegalization,HUFFINGTON POST DENV. (June 4,2013, 9:46 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/28/hickenlooper-signs-colora-n_3346798.html.
4. Id.

5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4-901(4)(f) (2013) ("It is unlawful for anyperson licensed to
sell retail marijuana" to "sell more than a quarter of an ounce of retail marijuana . . .to a
nonresident of the state").
6. Id. § 12-43.4-901(6).
7. Id.§ 18-1.3-501(1)(a). Washington, on the other hand, chose not to treat nonresidents
differently in the implementation of its legalization regime. See FAQs on 1-502, WASH. STATE
LIQUOR CONTROL BD., http://lcb.wa.gov/marijuana/faqsi-502 (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) ("Will
non-Washington residents be able to purchase marijuana? Yes, but the marijuana products are to be
consumed in Washington."). For background on legalization in both states, see generally Michael
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Treating purchasers of a legal product differently based on their state of
residency implicates constitutional doctrines that limit a state's ability to
discriminate against nonresidents. This Essay examines the Colorado
recommendation in light of two of those doctrines: the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section Two and the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine (DCCD). 8 At first glance, Colorado's faciallydiscriminatory law appears to be almost certainly unconstitutional under
current doctrine. This Essay will argue, however, that Colorado could
make a compelling case that its law does pass constitutional muster. This
argument is bolstered by the U.S. Supreme Court's recent treatment of
both Privileges and Immunities and dormant Commerce Clause claims in
McBurney v. Young, 9 as well as recent federal guidance on enforcement of
federal drug laws.
Part I of this Essay briefly describes the task force's recommendation,
its subsequent adoption by the Colorado legislature, and a recent
Department of Justice (DOJ) memorandum providing enforcement
guidance in light of state legalization initiatives. The DOJ memo is
particularly relevant to the defense-addressed in Part I---of the Colorado
nonresident purchase limit under both the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the DCCD. Finally, a brief conclusion suggests a role the
federal government could play to remove considerable, though not all,
constitutional doubt from state regulation of pot tourism.
I. LEGISLATIVE ADOPTION OF COLORADO'S AMENDMENT

64

TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

In March 2013, a task force established to implement Amendment 64 to
Colorado's constitution, legalizing marijuana in the state, released a
Vitiello, Joints or the Joint: Coloradoand Washington Square off Against the United States, 91
OR. L. REv. 1009 (2013).
8. Two other possible challenges merit mention, at least in passing. The first, a state
constitutional challenge, would claim that because the amendment requires only that a person show
some identification that proves they are of legal age, the residency requirement is at best
unenforceable if not unauthorized. Jacob Sullum, Colorado Will Soon Decide the Rulesfor Selling
Pot, REASON.COM (Apr. 22, 2013, 2:13 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/04/22/coloradolegislature-will-soon-decide-th. The second would involve an equal protection challenge under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. But "nonresident would-be purchaser of
marijuana" is unlikely to be considered a suspect classification, and thus, Colorado would need to
establish only that it has a rational basis for the distinction. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S.
Ct. 2073, 2079-80 (2012). While the Court has in the past invalidated legislative classifications that
discriminate against out-of-state commerce or disadvantage new residents, see, e.g., Hooper v.
Bemalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 614-16 (1985); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S.
869, 871, 874 (1985), these cases involve economic protectionism, which is absent from Colorado's
legislation. See text accompanying infra notes 62-63, 89-96, 107-09 (describing other cases and
instances where protectionism was absent).
9. 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1720 (2013) (rejecting Privileges and Immunities Clause and dormant
Commerce Clause challenges to a provision in Virginia's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that
permitted only citizens of the state to file FOIA requests).
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lengthy report containing its final recommendations.1 l Recommendation
7.1 suggested "that the General Assembly consider setting per-transaction
purchase limits that are more restrictive for non-residents than for
residents."" Acknowledging that residency requirements risked creating a
black market within the state, the task force nevertheless offered that:
[T]he Colorado General Assembly may wish to establish a
reasonable limit lower than one (1) ounce for both residents
and visitors, to discourage unlawful diversion of marijuana
out of the regulated system and out of the state, since the
lower transaction amount would make the accumulation of
marijuana more difficult. Reasonable purchase limits for
residents could be set at or above the level for out-of-state
residents, but not to exceed one (1) ounce.
In order to discourage the diversion of legally-purchased
marijuana out of Colorado, reduce the likelihood of federal
scrutiny of Colorado's adult-use marijuana industry, and
support harmonious relationships with Colorado's
neighboring states, an appropriate limit should be placed on
the amount of marijuana or marijuana-infused products that
can be purchased by out-of-state consumers. The Task Force
discussed possible transaction limits of 1/8-1/4 ounce of
marijuana, or its equivalent in infused products, for nonresidents. 12
The report added that additional safeguards against diversion should be
undertaken, including "point-of-sale information to out-of-state consumers,
signage at airports and near borders, coordination with neighboring states
regarding drug interdiction, and restricting retail licenses near the
borders.' 3 Colorado House Bill 1317 followed the task force
recommendation and limited nonresidents to a quarter-ounce purchase per
transaction. 14 As a result, only residents would be able to purchase, in a
single transaction, the full ounce they are permitted to legally possess
under the state constitution.' 5
Colorado's concern with the federal government's reaction to diversion
of marijuana was prescient. The Obama Administration had sent
10. TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENT 64 (Mar. 13, 2013),
available at http://www.colorado.gov/cms/forms/dor-tax/A64TaskForceFinalReport.pdf

11. Id.at 49-50.
12. Id.at 50.
13. Id.
14. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
15. Amendment 64 to Colorado's constitution decriminalizes possession or purchase of an
ounce of marijuana or six marijuana plants. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(a).
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conflicting signals about the status of state experiments. Ominously, it
raided a number of medical marijuana dispensaries in Washington State in
the summer of 2013.16 Finally, in August of 2013, the DOJ released a
memo that provided enforcement guidance for marijuana.' 7
The memo set forth "certain enforcement priorities that are particularly
important to the federal government" in light of state experiments with
legalization. 8 Specifically, the memo mentioned "[p]reventing the
diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some
form to other states."' 9 The memo also noted that the itemized priorities
"will continue to guide the Department's enforcement of the [Controlled
Substances Act] against marijuana-related conduct." 20 For behavior outside
the memo's "enforcement priorities," the memo would adhere to its
reliance "on state and local law enforcement agencies to address marijuana
activity through enforcement of their own narcotics laws." 2 1 The memo
further stressed that states must "implement strong and effective regulatory
and enforcement systems that will address the threat those state laws could
' 22
pose to public safety, public health, and other law enforcement interests.
It called on states that had legalized marijuana to implement "strong and
effective regulatory and enforcement systems" to "affirmatively address
[federal] priorities by, for example, implementing effective measures to
prevent diversion of marijuana outside of the regulated system and to other
states. 23 The memo warned that failure to address those enforcement
priorities could provoke federal intervention that would end legalization
experiments.24
ff. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON NONRESIDENT DISCRIMINATION
AND COLORADO'S NONRESIDENT PURCHASE LIMIT

Colorado's law makes a distinction on its face between residents and
nonresidents seeking to purchase marijuana, thus implicating the Privileges
and Immunities Clause and the DCCD, which both generally prohibit
discrimination against nonresidents and interstate commerce. At first
glance, therefore, the limit on nonresidents appears to face serious
16. See M. Alex Johnson, Feds Raid MedicalMar'uanaDispensariesin Washington State 9:39
PM),
Where
Possession is
Legal, NBCNEwS.COM
(July
24,
2013,

http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/07/24/19664590-feds-raid-medical-marijuana-dispensar
ies-in-washington-state-where-possession-is-legal.
17. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen. to All U.S. Attorneys 1 (Aug.
29, 2013), availableat http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 3.
24. See id.
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constitutional obstacles. On closer inspection, however, the differential
treatment might readily survive a challenge under either provision. The
remainder of this Part examines both challenges in turn.
A. The Privileges andImmunities Clause
ofArticle IV, Section Two
Because the Colorado law "poses the question whether [Colorado] can
deny out-of-state citizens a benefit that it has conferred on its own
citizens," 25 the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section
Two of the Constitution would seem the most appropriate ground for a
constitutional challenge. Adapted from a similar provision in the Articles
of Confederation, 26 the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV
reads: "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states.",27 The Founders intended' 28the
Clause-described by Alexander Hamilton as "the basis of the Union
to promote political union by prohibiting state discrimination against
outsiders that might provoke retaliation and disrupt that union.29 As
interpreted by the Court today, the Clause prohibits state discrimination
against nonresidents unless there is a "substantial reason" for the
discrimination and the discrimination itself is "substantially related" to the
reason for the discriminatory treatment.3 ° The Privileges and Immunities
Clause, however, guarantees only "fundamental rights" 3' such as the right
to earn a living on terms of substantial equality as residents32 and the right
to receive medical care available to residents. 3
Predicting what a court (or the Court) would do with a Privileges and
Immunities Clause challenge to a law limiting the amount of pot
nonresidents could buy, as compared to residents, certainly involves
guesswork. The Court has never clearly stated what rights are fundamental
and trigger the protection of the Clause; neither has the Court been clear
25. McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1720 (2013).
26. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV.
27. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
28. Tim FEDERALIST No. 80, at 436-37 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
29. See generally Brannon P. Denning, Why the PrivilegesandImmunities ClauseofArticle
IV CannotReplace the Dormant Commerce ClauseDoctrine,88 MINN. L. REV. 384,388-90 (2003)

(providing historical background on the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
30. See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1998); Supreme
Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1948).
31. See, e.g., McBumey v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1714-15 (2013) ("[W]e have long held
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects only those privileges and immunities that are
fundamental." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371, 388 (1978) (holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not apply because elk
hunting is not a fundamental right).
32. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219
(1984).
33. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss6/3

6

Kahng: The Taxation of Intellectual Capital
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON "POTTOURISM" RESTRICTIONS

,.

2285

about what counts as a substantial reason for differential treatment; nor
about how tight the means-ends fit must be to satisfy the substantiallyrelated prong. However, several reasons exist for courts to give some
latitude to a state seeking to curb pot tourism by restricting the amount of
marijuana nonresidents may obtain at each dispensary visit. First, it is
unlikely that the ability to buy marijuana qualifies as a fundamental rightat least for recreational users. Second, even if it does qualify, the state
could make plausible arguments that nonresidents who cross the border,
buy marijuana, and might sell it elsewhere would constitute a "peculiar
source of evil" justifying differential treatment. 34 The arguments seem at
least nonfrivolous, though, their strength would likely depend on the record
established at trial. More importantly, however, unlike laws restricting bar
membership to state residents or taxes that favor residents over
nonresidents, no apparent protectionist motive animates Colorado's law.
1. Is Recreational Drug Use a "Fundamental Right"?
The threshold difficulty with bringing a successful Privileges and
Immunities Clause claim against a nonresident purchase limit would be
proving that buying pot in a state where it is legal is a fundamental right. In
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission,35 the Court rejected a Privileges and
Immunities Clause challenge to a Montana law charging out-of-state hunters
more for elk hunting permits.36 Elk hunting, the Court reasoned, was mere
recreation and not a fundamental privilege or immunity guaranteed by Article
IV.37 The Baldwin Court, though, neither defined the class of fundamental
rights that the Clause protected, nor articulated the criteria for the future
evaluation of fundamental rights claims.
The recent McBurney v. Young 38 decision shored up Baldwin by
reaffirming that the privileges and immunities protected by the Clause must be
fundamental, and clarifying that the Clause "does not mean... that 'state
citizenship or residency may never be used by a State to distinguish among
persons.' 39 McBurney involved a challenge to Virginia's Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), which makes public records available for inspection
or copying, but only to citizens of the state.40 The petitioners were nonresidents
whose requests for information under Virginia's FOIA were denied because
they were not Virginia citizens; the petitioners claimed the citizens-ony
provision violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the DCCD.
34. See Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398.
35. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).

36. Id. at 388.
37. Id.
38.

133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013).

39. Id. at 1714 (quoting Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383).
40. Id. at 1713.
41. Id. at 1714.
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The petitioners-one seeking records from the state regarding a child
support matter, the other requesting real estate tax records on behalf of
clients-argued that the citizens-only provision implicated four
fundamental rights.42 These included "the opportunity to pursue a common
calling, the ability to own and transfer property, access to the.., courts,
and access to public information. ' 43 The Court unanimously held that the
Virginia law did not infringe the first three and that the fourth was not a
fundamental privilege or immunity.44
In dispatching the claim that the provision infringed "the right to access
public information," the Court concluded that no such broad right was a
fundamental right under the Clause. It reaffirmed the Court's prior
holdings that "there is no constitutional right to obtain all the information
provided by FOIA laws. ' 45 The Court also looked to history, noting that
early cases "do not support the proposition that a broad-based right ' to6
access public information was widely recognized in the early Republic. A
The Court observed that "FOIA laws are of relatively recent vintage" and
that however useful they might be, "[t]here is no contention that the
Nation's unity foundered in their absence, or that it is suffering now
because of
the citizens-only FOIA provisions that several States have
47
enacted.
The holdings of Baldwin and McBurney would almost certainly doom
any Privileges and Immunities Clause claim related to nonmedical
marijuana use. First, purchasing marijuana for recreational use is, like elk
hunting, recreational-notthe sort of activity essential to the maintenance
of the Union.48 In fact, far from causing friction between states, which the
Clause was meant to prevent, Colorado's law seeks to ameliorate any
friction by reducing the incentives for nonresidents to purchase pot in
Colorado and import it into states where it is still illegal. Second,
McBurney also seems to stand for the proposition that the fundamentalright inquiry is, in part, a historical one. If access to public records does not
qualify because FOIA laws are of "relatively recent vintage," arguments
that equal access to legal marijuana is a fundamental right seem almost
frivolous.
2. Would Medical Marijuana Users Fare Better?
On the other hand, at least some out-of-state purchasers might seek
marijuana for medicinal purposes and might seek equal access under Doe
42. Id. at 1714-15.
43. Id. at 1715.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 1718.
Id.
Id.at 1719.
See text accompanying supra notes 28-29.
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v. Bolton.49 In Doe, the Court invalidated provisions of a Georgia law
restricting nonresidents from obtaining abortions in that state. 50 For the
Court, Justice Blackmun wrote that:
Just as the Privileges and Immunities Clause

. .

. protects

persons who enter other States to ply their trade ...so must it
protect persons who enter Georgia seeking the medical
services that are available there ....

A contrary holding

would mean that a State could limit to its own residents the
general medical care available within its borders. 51
The Court decided Doe prior to Baldwin's announcement that the
Clause protected only fundamental rights, but the latter decision gave no
indication the Court intended to disturb its prior holdings. In any event, it
is hardly a stretch to argue that access to needed medical care in another
state, no less than the right to earn a living or ply a trade there, is the sort of
fundamental right the Clause was intended to secure. Imagine that
Maryland, Minnesota, or Texas passed laws restricting the care provided
by their world-class medical centers to only their own state residents. Such
parochialism would be inconsistent with the political union the
Constitution created, to put it mildly,52 and retaliatory measures from
affected states would likely follow. At the very least, the provision of
medical care is far removed from the provision of recreational activities
such as elk hunting or nonmedicinal marijuana use.53
Further, marijuana remains a Schedule I drug under the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA), meaning that the federal government does not
acknowledge it as having any acceptable medical use.54 In UnitedStates v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, the Supreme Court held that
marijuana's Schedule I status prevented a defendant from raising a
necessity defense to contempt proceedings brought by the federal
government for violation of an injunction to prevent the sale of medical
marijuana pursuant to state law.55 Conceivably, the absence of any
recognized medical use for marijuana under the CSA would bar a
nonresident's Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge even for
medicinal purposes.

49. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
50. Id. at 200-01.
51. Id. at 200.
52. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.

53. If Doe's outcome turned on the fact that abortion was, in 1973, a fundamental
constitutional right under the Due Process Clause, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), the
opinion in Doe gave no hint of it.
54. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 489-90 (2001).
Thanks to Rob Mikos for raising this point.
55. Id. at491-92,494.
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3. Satisfying the Rest of the Test
The difficulties with a Privileges and Immunities Clause claim do not
end with an answer to the question of whether the right of nonresidents to
obtain pot on the same terms as residents is fundamental. Article IV,
Section Two does not guarantee absolute equality in all fundamental rights;
rather, the Court has said that nonresidents are guaranteed the right to
substantial equality with residents. 56 The test is whether there is a
substantial reason for discrimination and whether the discrimination bears
a substantial relationship to the end the state is pursuing. 57 As the Court put
it, "classifications based on the fact of non-citizenship" are
unconstitutional under the Clause, "unless there is something to indicate
that non-citizens constitute apeculiarsource of evil at which the statute is
aimed. 5 8 In deciding whether there is a sufficiently established
relationship between the harm the state is trying to prevent and noncitizens, "the Court has considered the availability of less restrictive
means." 59 In practice, this test has been difficult to satisfy, 60 though, the
Court's recent McBurney decision offers additional support for Colorado's
law.
The McBurney Court held that Virginia's FOIA did not infringe three
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause"the opportunity to pursue a common callingF the ability to own and
transfer property, [and] access to the [] courts." "The Virginia law did not
infringe the right to ply a trade or business because, according to the Court,
it "has struck laws down as violating the privilege of pursuing a common
calling only when those laws were enacted for the protectionist purpose of
burdening out-of-state citizens." 62 The petitioner did not "allege-and has
offered no proof-that the challenged provision of the Virginia FOIA was
enacted in order to provide a competitive economic advantage for Virginia
citizens.' 63 Virginia law, moreover, did not prevent noncitizens from
obtaining "title documents and mortgage records... necessary to the
transfer of property." 64 Further, the state and its subdivisions generally
made real estate tax assessment records, sought by one of
65 the petitioners,
available online rendering a FOIA request unnecessary.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 30.
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948) (emphasis added).
Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985).

60. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 486 (4th ed.

2011) (commenting that "[t]hus far, the Court has not found that any law meets this rigorous test").
61. McBumey v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1715 (2013).
62. Id.
63. Id.

64. Id. at 1716 (listing items open for inspection and copying by "any person" regardless of
their residency).
65. Id. at 1710.
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The other petitioner, who sought agency records relevant to a childsupport dispute with his ex-wife, claimed the citizens-only provision
burdened his access to public proceedings. 66 The Court noted that he was
able to obtain almost all the information sought under the state FOIA by
using another Virginia statute.67 The Court held that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause "does not require States to erase any distinction
between citizens and non-citizens that might
conceivably give state
' 68
citizens some detectable litigation advantage.
Interestingly, the Court in McBurney treated the lack of any lurking
protectionist purpose and the availability of functional alternatives as
dispositive. The Court did not inquire further into the substantialness of the
reasons for the differential treatment nor did it assess the means-ends fit
between the citizens-only restriction and whatever end Virginia was
pursuing. This bodes well for Colorado's law, especially if a court were to
conclude that the purchase of marijuana for medicinal purposes was a
fundamental right under Doe.
Unlike other laws successfully challenged under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause,69 Colorado did not design the purchase limits for
nonresidents to enrich in-state residents at the expense of those from outof-state, or to hoard a resource to keep prices artificially depressed for instate consumers. The task force mentioned three reasons for differentiating
between in-state and out-of-state residents: (1) preventing diversion of
legal marijuana to the black market; (2) reducing federal scrutiny; and (3)
respecting the policy choices of neighboring states. 70 These reasonscoupled with the lack of any explicit (or covert) protectionist motiveought to qualify as substantial. Under McBurney, the lack of any
protectionist motive might be sufficient to end the inquiry.
Assuming a reviewing court applied the rest of the test, could
Colorado's law survive scrutiny? Specifically, would purchase amount
restrictions bear a substantial relationship to the reasons given for
differentiating between residents and nonresidents in the first place? And
would those reasons themselves qualify as "substantial"? In other words, to
quote the Court in Toomer, could Colorado anticipate that nonresidents
would be (or become)
a "peculiar source of evil" justifying the lower
7
purchase amounts? '
Here again, Colorado could make a strong case. The state would argue
that the goal of the law was not to discriminate against nonresidents qua
66. Id.at 1717.
67. Id.at 1717-18.
68. Id.at 1717.
69. See, e.g.,
Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 315 (1998); Supreme
Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 282-83 (1985); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-96, 403
(1948).
70. Supra text accompanying note 12.
71. Supra text accompanying note 58.
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nonresidents. Rather, it was to prevent nonresidents from buying legal
marijuana in Colorado and transporting it in interstate commerce-a
federal crime72--back to their state of residence where it may be illegal to
possess marijuana for recreational or even medical use.73 If the federal
government found pot tourists overly eager to return home with souvenirs
of their travels, it might feel pressure to take a more proactive enforcement
role than it is currently inclined to take. 74 Further pressure on the federal
government could come from neighboring states whose policy choices are
being undermined by their proximity to Colorado.75 From Colorado's
perspective then, nonresidents-at least nonresidents currently living in
states where marijuana is illegal, which is most everywhere-are a
"peculiar source of evil" because they are likely the very purchasers who
would carry pot out of the state and draw unwanted attention to Colorado's
permissive regime.
In addition, Colorado's law does not bar nonresidents from obtaining
marijuana; it simply potentially requires nonresidents to engage in more
transactions than residents to obtain the same desired quantity. In a similar
fashion, Virginia made it marginally more difficult for nonresidents to
obtain certain public records by restricting its FOIA to citizens, but
alternate sources of information existed that the Court determined were
sufficient. 76 Colorado might argue that nonresidents' ability to obtain the
same quantity by visiting multiple retail establishments means that despite
appearances, its law does not really discriminate at all, or only
discriminates incidentally, much like Virginia's citizen-only FOIA
provision.
Traditionally, the Court has considered the availability of less restrictive
means when assessing the means-ends fit under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.77 Does Colorado's ability to level up (by eliminating
the nonresident purchase restriction) or level down (by imposing the same
quarter-ounce limit on Colorado residents) render its law ipso facto
72. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012).
73. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-214 (2014) (criminalizing marijuana possession for
personal use).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 17-24.
75. Reminiscent of the days prior to Prohibition in which states struggled to control alcohol
shipped into states where it was illegal, individual state attempts to stop illicit cross-border traffic in
marijuana from Colorado or to stop its citizens from going to Colorado to engage in pot tourism
would run into similar Privileges and Immunities and DCCD problems. See BRANNON P. DENNING,
BITTKER ON THE REGULATON OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 13.02 (2d ed. 2013)

(describing the difficulties of regulating interstate traffic in liquor prior to the ratification of the
Eighteenth Amendment); see also infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (suggesting federal
legislation to free states from some of these restrictions when regulating pot tourism by drawing on
historical analogies to pre-Prohibition efforts to empower states to regulate liquor coming into the
state).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
77. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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unconstitutional? Because the analysis is similar under both the Privileges
and Immunities Clause and the DCCD, this Essay will take this question
up in the next Section.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause Challenges
The DCCD is the term given to the judge-made doctrine limiting a state
or local government's ability to discriminate against or otherwise
impermissibly burden interstate commerce. 78 These limits derive from the
Constitution granting Congress power over interstate commerce.7 9 Like the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the DCCD subjects to particular
scrutiny laws that explicitly target foreign goods or commercial actors for
unfavorable treatment relative to in-state goods or actors. This Section
examines whether Colorado's discriminatory nonresident purchase limit
would be vulnerable to a DCCD challenge.
Under the Court's modern doctrine, laws that discriminate on their
faceor in their purposes or effects will be subject to a form of strict scrutiny
requiring the government to prove that (1) the law furthered a legitimate
(i.e., nonprotectionist) end, and (2) the end cannot be achieved using less
discriminatory means.80 Truly nondiscriminatory laws, however, will be
subject to a more deferential balancing test, under which a challenger must
show that the "burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.' 1 Because Colorado's
law draws an explicit distinction between residents and nonresidents, it
would be subject to strict scrutiny if the DCCD applies.
1. Is Interstate Commerce Involved?
Would the DCCD apply? In addition to their Privileges and Immunities
Clause claim, the McBurney plaintiffs argued that Virginia's citizens-only
FOIA provision violated the DCCD as well. The Court rejected their claim
in part because, in its estimation, "Virginia's FOIA neither 'regulates' nor
'burdens' interstate commerce; rather, it merely provides a service to local
citizens that would not otherwise be available at all."82
78. See generallyDENNING, supranote 75, §§ 6.01-.08 (providing in depth background and
analysis on the DCCD).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
80. See DENNING, supra note 75, § 6.06[A].
81. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
82. McBumey v. Young, 133 S.Ct. 1709, 1720 (2013). The Court observed that, in the
alternative, the market participant exception to the DCCD could justify the restriction. Id.Under
this exception, a state that buys or sells goods or services with taxpayer money is entitled to
discriminate in favor of in-state buyers or sellers. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,
432-33, 446 (1980) (upholding a state regulation requiring a state-owned cement factory to fill
orders of in-state customers before filling orders from nonresidents); see also DENNING, supranote
75, § 7.02; Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-ParticipantExemption to the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395, 421-22 (1989) ("[l~t seems sensible that when a state
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By contrast, there is little doubt that enough interstate commerce is
involved in marijuana sales to implicate the DCCD. First, nonresident pot
tourists would be traveling in interstate commerce to purchase marijuana
legally in Colorado. Second, in Gonzales v. Raich,83 the Court concluded
that the production and consumption of locally-produced, noncommercial
medical marijuana substantially affected the interstate marijuana market
and was thus subject to congressional regulation under the CSA. 84 Raich's
holding is relevant here because, as the Court has made clear elsewhere,
"[t]he definition of 'commerce' is the same when relied on to strike down
or restrict state legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of
federal control or regulation." 85 Therefore, state restrictions on the sale of
marijuana to nonresidents, even if applied within Colorado, would likely
substantially affect interstate commerce and would trigger DCCD
scrutiny.86

government distributes state resources, it may-on behalf of all its citizens-pick and choose
among the proper recipients. An essential feature of having property is, after all, the right to exclude
others."); Norman R. Williams, Taking Careof Ourselves: State Citizenship, the Market, and the
State, 69 01o ST. L.J. 469, 495 (2008) (discussing states providing "some preferential treatment
for state citizens in distributing taxpayer-ftmded services").
83. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
84. Id.at 19, 22; see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 574 (1997) (rejecting an argument that the DCCD did not apply to a discriminatory tax credit
available to a not-for-profit summer camp serving state residents but unavailable to not-for-profit
summer camps serving out-of-state campers); id. ("The services that petitioner provides to its
principally out-of-state campers clearly have a substantial effect on commerce, as do state
restrictions on making those services available to nonresidents.").
85. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 n.2 (1979).
86. The DOJ memo notwithstanding, marijuana remains illegal under the CSA. The astute
reader might wonder whether the DCCD applies at all because instead of congressional inactionthe DCCD is a default rule that applies when there is federal legislative quiescence--Congress has
very much spoken on the marijuana question. Here the author must enter a plea in confession and
avoidance. The preemptive effect of the CSA on state legalization efforts is a complicated issue. For
arguments that the preemptive effect of the CSA is much less than judges have assumed, see
generally Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the ControlledSubstancesAct, 16 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL'Y 5 (2013); Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marquanaand the
States' Overlooked Power to Legalize FederalCrime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (2009). But see
generally Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism,HorizontalFederalism,andLegal Obstacles
to State MarijuanaLegalizationEfforts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with
author) (arguing that state legalization efforts are more vulnerable to preemption than Professor
Mikos does, but noting that it might not be easy to find a party with standing to raise the issue). As
a practical matter, the DOJ memo means the federal government will not be swooping in to invoke
the CSA's preemptive effect as long as states remain attentive to the enforcement priorities listed in
that memo; thus it is as if Congress is silent, though only because the executive branch has
exercised its discretion not to enforce the CSA in Colorado or Washington. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
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2. Satisfying Strict Scrutiny Under the DCCD
Could a Colorado statute that limited nonresidents' purchases satisfy
strict scrutiny? Ordinarily, facially-discriminatory state laws are presumed
87
to be unconstitutional unless an exception to the DCCD applies.
However, there is one case in which the Court concluded that a
discriminatory state law passed constitutional muster. That case, Maine v.
Taylor,88 is instructive, for it sheds some light on what sort of evidentiary
burden the state must carry to meet both prongs of strict scrutiny. A close
reading of Taylor shows that DCCD strict scrutiny is not "'strict' in theory
and fatal in fact" 89 when economic protectionism does not taint the state's
actions. 90 Taylor provides a roadmap for Colorado officials who might be
called upon in the future to defend different resident and nonresident
purchase amounts against a DCCD challenge.
Maine v. Taylor involved a Maine law prohibiting the importation of
live baitfish. 9 1 A federal grand jury in the District of Maine indicted Taylor
for violating a federal law that prohibited the importation of wildlife into a
state in violation of that state's laws. 92 Taylor sought to dismiss the
indictment claiming that Maine's importation ban violated the DCCD. 93
87. See, e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (noting that "where
simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtuallyper se rule of invalidity
has been erected" and that the "clearest example of such legislation is a law that overtly blocks the
flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders"). There are three recognized exceptions to the
DCCD, none of which are relevant here. See DENNING, supra note 75, § 7.01. First, while Congress
may override the DCCD by exercising its affirmative power over interstate commerce, it has not
authorized the states to discriminate against nonresident marijuana buyers. But see infra notes 12124 and accompanying text (suggesting Congress can use its affirmative commerce power to permit
states to regulate pot tourism free from the strictures of the DCCD). Second, states acting as marketparticipants-that is, buying or selling goods or services in the market as private purchasers
might-may discriminate between residents and nonresidents. See supranote 82 and accompanying
text. However, Colorado is not a market participant; it is not buying or selling marijuana itself.
Finally, states may discriminate in favor of "public entities" that are engaged in the provision of
"traditional governmental functions." See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 343 (2008);
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part). For a discussion of the third exception, see generally DENNING, supranote
75, § 7.08; Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The "New Protectionism" and the
American Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 247, 262-94 (2009) (describing the creation,
case law, and rationales for the public-entities exception). The public-entities exception is not
applicable here either, because Colorado has not monopolized the marijuana market in the state.
88. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
89. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8
(1972).
90. See infra Subsection II.B.2.a.
91. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 132.
92. Id. at 132-33.
93. Id. at 133.
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The state defended the law on the ground "that the ban legitimately
protect[ed] the State's fisheries from parasites and nonnative species that
might be included in shipments of live baitfish., 94 Specifically, Maine's
experts testified that out-of-state fish carried parasites foreign to the state's
native fish stocks and that other invasive species inadvertently included in
95
imported shipments of baitfish could threaten Maine's native ecology.
The experts also testified that there "was no satisfactory way to
96 inspect
shipments of live baitfish for parasites or commingled species."
Reversing the court of appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
import ban, concluding that it satisfied strict scrutiny.97 First, the Court
held that Maine's environmental concerns were legitimate, despite the fact
that the risks were "imperfectly understood" and might "ultimately prove
to be negligible." 98 On the question of whether less discriminatory means
were available, the Court wrote that "[n]o matter how one describes the
abstract issue," the "more specific question whether scientifically accepted
techniques exist for the sampling and inspection of live baitfish is one of
fact, and the District Court's finding that such techniques have not been
devised cannot be characterized as clearly erroneous.
Indeed, the record
99
probably could not support a contrary finding."
a. Colorado's Legitimate Goals
Given the nonprotectionist nature of the task force's recommended
restrictions, the Court would likely describe Colorado's aims as
legitimate.100 "As long as a state does not needlessly obstruct interstate
trade or attempt to 'place itself in a position of economic isolation,"' the
Taylor Court stressed, "it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the
10 1
health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources."
There is no hint that any limitations on nonresident purchases of marijuana
were intended to confer some benefit on Colorado pot growers, sellers, or
consumers at the expense of nonresidents.' 0 2 Rather, as noted earlier, the

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.at 133.
Id.at 140-41.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 148.
Id.at 146.
See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.

101.

Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151.

102. Colorado's position would be even better on this question than was Maine's in Taylor.
The Court dismissed some slight evidence in Taylor that the refusal to lift the ban on baitfish was
motivated in part by economic protectionism in the form of astatement by the Maine Department of
Inland Fisheries and Wildlife in opposition to lifting the ban. Id.at 149. Taken in context, the Court
concluded, the department's statement simply challenged the argument that supplies of bait were
sufficiently low to warrant acceptance of any environmental risks that might accompany
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goals are to prevent diversion of marijuana to out-of-state black markets
and reduce friction with the federal government and other states.
Just as the Taylor Court did not require absolute proof of either the
extent or the magnitude of the environmental threat Maine sought to
mitigate,10 3 a reviewing court should defer to Colorado's identification of
possible problems with legalization as legitimate. The proposed remedy
should also stand, especially in light of the DOJ enforcement memo.
Colorado's experiment with legalization is unprecedented. 0 4 The lack of
legalization in most other states, and the federal government's
equivocation on the issue of enforcement of federal laws means that
Colorado's fears-that unchecked nonresident travel to the state to
purchase marijuana could generate unwanted attention from and friction
with the federal and neighboring state governments-are hardly fanciful.
Even if these fears ultimately fail to materialize, or if the magnitude of the
problems arising from pot tourism are of smaller scope than the state
imagines, they closely resemble Maine's fears about the integrity of its fish
stocks and ecosystem.
b. Are Less Discriminatory Means Available?
The more difficult question-under either the DCCD or the Privileges
and Immunities Clause-is whether Colorado could pursue its legitimate
goals through less restrictive or less discriminatory means. Challengers
might claim, for example, that because Colorado could level up or down by
either limiting all purchasers to a quarter-ounce per transaction or permit
nonresidents to purchase the maximum amount residents are allowed to
buy in a single purchase, the state has less discriminatory means at its
disposal to pursue its legitimate goals. The answer to this question turns on
whether the state is obligated to use the least discriminatory means
available to it. Maine v. Taylor suggests that it is not; so does at least one
example from the Court's free speech jurisprudence.
i. Maine v. Taylor's Less Restrictive Means Analysis
The Taylor Court concluded that the state met its burden of proving
lack of less discriminatory means, and that it was not clearly erroneous for
the district court to rely on uncontradicted testimony that no reliable
methods of testing and screening imported baitfish existed.105 As the Court
made clear, the availability of less restrictive means depends on the facts in
importation. Id. at 150. But see id at 152 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is something fishy about
this case.").
103. In fact, the Taylor Court held that the ban was legitimate even if no significant threat
ultimately materialized. Id. at 148 (majority opinion).
104. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 321-22 (discussing the states' role as laboratories in
which policy experiments could be tested before launching them on a national scale).
105. Id. at 146.
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the record. 10 6 The Supreme Court admonished the appellate court for
holding that the district court had erred in ruling that no less discriminatory
means were available, and it declared the lower court was "not to decide
factual questions de novo, reversing any findings [it] would have made
differently. 107
Further, despite the Court's readiness to concede that some tests for the
parasites "could be easily developed,"'' 0 8 it agreed with the district court
judge that:
the "abstract possibility" of developing acceptable testing
procedures, particularly when there is no assurance as to their
effectiveness, does not make those procedures an
"[a]vailabl[e] ... nondiscriminatory

alternativ[e],"

for

purpose of the Commerce Clause. A State must make
reasonable efforts to avoid restraining the free flow of
commerce across its borders, but it is not required to develop
new and unproven means of protection at an uncertain cost.
The Court invited opponents of the ban to develop such tests, noting
that "if and when such procedures are developed, Maine no longer may be
able to justify its import ban. The State need not join in those
' 1 efforts,
however, and it need not pretend they already have succeeded. 10
If the DCCD's less-discriminatory-means prong meant that Maine was
obliged to use the least discriminatory means, then it seems that the Court
would have required the state to develop tests for the imported baitfish
before banning them, especially in light of the uncertain scope and severity
of the problem. That it did not, strongly suggests that the Court was willing
to give the state some leeway in light of its legitimate interests and lack of
protectionist motive. If this is indeed the case, then perhaps the appropriate
doctrinal analogy for a less-discriminatory-means analysis is the version of
narrow tailoring that the Court employs in its review of content-neutral
speech regulations. In those cases, the Court has explicitly rejected
arguments that the narrow tailoring requirement obligates the state to use
the least speech-restrictive means at its disposal.
ii. Narrow Tailoring, Content-Neutral Speech
Regulations, and the DCCD
In Ward v. RockAgainst Racism,I' the Court held that narrow tailoring
of content-neutral speech restrictions did not require employing "the least
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See supra text accompanying note 99; supra note 102 and accompanying text.
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 145.
Id. at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 147.
491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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restrictive or least intrusive means" of achieving the government's
interests. 112 "Rather," the Court continued, "the requirement of narrow
tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial
governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.""' 13 A court's opinion that the government could have
employed "some less-speech-restrictive alternative" is not a sufficient basis
to invalidate a regulation "[s]o long as the means chosen are not
substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's
interest."' 14
The Court's imposition of a lesser standard of review is rooted in the
animating purpose behind its content-based/content-neutral distinction:
that the First Amendment prohibits government from penalizing officially
disfavored ideas. Because government could attempt to mask its true
intentions by broadly drawing speech regulations, intermediate scrutiny of
apparently content-neutral regulations requires courts first to determine
whether the true purpose of the governmental regulation is to suppress
ideas. 115 Once the lack of such motive is confirmed, the Court's
jurisprudence grants some leeway, as long as the regulations do not stifle
too much speech.
Just as the Court's free speech jurisprudence is designed to ensure that
government does not overtly or covertly suppress ideas, the DCCD is
designed to implement the constitutional principle that states may not
exercise regulatory power over interstate commerce in ways that risk
undermining political union among the states.116 The DCCD's
antidiscrimination principle, reflected in the Court's scrutiny of laws that
discriminate against interstate commerce, is aimed at the types of state
actions that were (and remain) the most likely sources of friction among
states and most likely to ignite cycles of retaliation and further
discrimination.1 17 If the government receives some slack in the First
Amendment context when it satisfies the Court that it is not out to suppress
ideas, then similar leeway as to means should be available under the
DCCD's no-less-discriminatory-means prong if the state can establish that
112. Id. at 798.
113. Id. at 799 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985)).
114. Id. at 800.
115. 1d. at 791 (indentifying the "principal inquiry" in content neutrality as "whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys").
116. Or so this author has argued. See Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant
Commerce ClauseDoctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 417, 484-85 (2008).
117. See McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. 1709, 1719 (2013) (noting that the DCCD "is driven
by a concern about 'economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit instate economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors"' (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind.
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988))).
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its ends have nothing to do with economic
protectionism or retaliation
8
against states with which it trades. 1
iii. Less Discriminatory Means and Colorado's
Nonresident Purchase Limits
Colorado wants to discourage the diversion of legally-purchased
marijuana out of Colorado, reduce the likelihood of federal scrutiny of
Colorado's adult-use marijuana industry, and support harmonious
relationships with Colorado's neighboring states. There is no hint that a
desire to benefit residents at the expense of nonresidents is at the heart of
the per-transaction restriction. If the restriction was a bid to artificially
depress the price of marijuana for the benefit of Colorado's residents, one
would expect to see a total ban on nonresident purchases rather than the
amount restriction per dispensary visit that the legislature enacted. Cases
like Maine v. Taylor and the recent McBurney v. Young decision strongly
suggest that a state government's leeway to distinguish between residents
and nonresidents should increase in the absence of a protectionist motive.
Worried that nonresidents are more likely than residents to engage in
smurfing, Colorado has decided to make it slightly more difficult for
nonresidents to divert legal Colorado pot to markets where it remains
illegal. If one believes the state's concern is a legitimate one, leveling up-permitting nonresidents and residents to purchase the same amount per
visit-would not only make Colorado's safeguard less effective, it would
completely undermine its purpose. Leveling down by restricting both
Colorado residents and nonresidents to a quarter-ounce of marijuana per
visit might be unconstitutional under state law, which decriminalizes the
possession and purchase of an ounce of marijuana."1 9 Regardless, leveling
down would disadvantage state residents who the legislature has decided
are less likely to engage in smurfing. Though there might be some
conceivable methods yet to be developed that could track the purchasers
(RFID tags on bags of pot? Smokeable nanobots that transmit the location
of purchased marijuana?), their mere possibility should not be sufficient to
invalidate the purchase limitations based on the fact that the state failed to
pursue the least discriminatory means before restricting commerce, as the
holding in Taylor illustrates.
Facially-discriminatory laws labor under a presumption of
unconstitutionality, often for good reason. But as Maine v. Taylor and
McBurney v. Young demonstrate, the Court has acknowledged that states
118. Professor Donald Regan famously argued that the presence or absence of a protectionist
motive behind state and local laws was the key to understanding the entire DCCD. See Donald H.
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1148-50 (1986).
119. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(a).
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can restrict trade for reasons other than securing commercial advantage for
residents or punishing those who reside elsewhere. In their haste to enforce
the Privileges and Immunities Clause or a valuable (and venerable)
doctrine like the DCCD, courts should not engage in reflexive or
unthinking applications, even where a law has a powerful indicium of
unconstitutionality like facial discrimination. Colorado's legalization of
marijuana and restriction on sales to nonresidents are unlike anything
courts have encountered recently. Given the fact that this proposed fetter
on interstate commerce-and a fairly mild fetter at that-was intended to
avoid interstate friction, not exacerbate it, courts should grant the state
some experimental leeway in the means it chooses to enforce its legitimate
interests, at least initially.120
CONCLUSION

More states are likely to follow Colorado's lead and experiment with
partial or complete decriminalization of marijuana. Because states will
proceed at different speeds, the problem of regulating pot tourism is likely
to arise with increasing frequency. State regulatory efforts, moreover, are
equally likely to be met with challenges by nonresidents claiming that
differential treatment is unconstitutional. Though this Essay's conclusions
are of necessity preliminary, it maintains that states have good arguments
that provisions like the Privileges and Immunities Clause would not apply
or that nonresident purchase limits could satisfy the standards of review of
either the Article IV Clause or the DCCD. Colorado's motives appear to be
pure and its aims-preventing diversion, avoiding a federal crackdown,
and minimizing friction with its neighbors-legitimate. Colorado should
therefore receive some leeway from courts as to the means it chooses to
achieve these ends.
One final thought: The DCCD is simply a default rule; Congress has the
power to disable the DCCD by exercising its affirmative power over
interstate commerce. 121 A century ago, Congress used that power to grant
states the ability to prevent importation of alcohol in violation of state
laws. 122 The old division between wet and dry states may soon give way to
a similar divide between, forgive me, "toking" and "non-toking" sections
120. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946) ("[The] plenary
scope [of the Commerce Clause] enables Congress not only to promote but also to prohibit
interstate commerce, as it has done frequently and for a great variety of reasons."); Id. at 429, 43940 (rejecting a claim that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which allowed state laws that regulate the
business of insurance to supersede acts of Congress, violated Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause). But see Norman R. Williams, Why CongressMay Not "Overrule" the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REv. 153, 234 (2005) (arguing that Benjamin was wrongly
decided).
122. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1913, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (codified as amended 27 U.S.C. § 122

(2012)) (prohibiting importation of intoxicating liquors into states in violation of state laws).
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of the country. 12 3 And, as in the pre-Prohibition days, the DCCD might
operate as a barrier to state regulatory efforts either to minimize the impact
on its neighbors of its decision to liberalize its laws or to meet challenges
posed by nearby liberalization. If the legalization trend continues,
Congress-as it did when states were struggling to meet the challenges
posed by interstate trade in alcohol-should consider legislation that frees
states from the strictures of the DCCD when coping with the effects of
legalization. Such action would not preempt all constitutional
challenges, 124 but legislation would go far toward removing constitutional
doubts from state efforts and could even encourage experimentation as
states confront the many legal and regulatory puzzles that will attend
legalized marijuana.

123. Thanks to Alli Denning and Ben Barton for suggesting other analogues to "wet" and
"dry" states.
124. Congress, for example, cannot override the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV. See Denning, supra note 29, at 398-99. But see Gillian E. Metzger, Congress,Article IV and
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1468, 1487-89 (2007) (suggesting that courts should
interpret Article IV to permit a similar congressional override).
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